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Abstract
Deep learning has triggered the current rise of artificial intelligence and is the workhorse
of today’s machine intelligence. Numerous success stories have rapidly spread all over
science, industry and society, but its limitations have only recently come into focus. In this
perspective we seek to distil how many of deep learning’s problem can be seen as different
symptoms of the same underlying problem: shortcut learning. Shortcuts are decision rules
that perform well on standard benchmarks but fail to transfer to more challenging testing
conditions, such as real-world scenarios. Related issues are known in Comparative Psy-
chology, Education and Linguistics, suggesting that shortcut learning may be a common
characteristic of learning systems, biological and artificial alike. Based on these observa-
tions, we develop a set of recommendations for model interpretation and benchmarking,
highlighting recent advances in machine learning to improve robustness and transferability
from the lab to real-world applications.
1 Introduction
If science was a journey, then its destination would be the discovery of simple explanations
to complex phenomena. There was a time when the existence of tides, the planet’s orbit
around the sun, and the observation that “things fall down” were all largely considered to be
independent phenomena—until 1687, when Isaac Newton formulated his law of gravitation
that provided an elegantly simple explanation to all of these (and many more). Physics has
made tremendous progress over the last few centuries, but the thriving field of deep learning
is still very much at the beginning of its journey—often lacking a detailed understanding
of the underlying principles.
For some time, the tremendous success of deep learning has perhaps overshadowed
the need to thoroughly understand the behaviour of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). In an
ever-increasing pace, DNNs were reported as having achieved human-level object classifi-
cation performance [1], beating world-class human Go, Poker, and Starcraft players [2, 3],
detecting cancer from X-ray scans [4], translating text across languages [5], helping com-
bat climate change [6], and accelerating the pace of scientific progress itself [7]. Because
of these successes, deep learning has gained a strong influence on our lives and society. At
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
4.
07
78
0v
3 
 [c
s.C
V]
  2
0 M
ay
 20
20
Problem
Shortcut
Task for DNN Answer question
Changes answer if irrelevant
information is added
 
Recognise object
Hallucinates teapot if cer-
tain patterns are present
Uses features irrecogni-
sable to humans
Recognise pneumonia
Fails on scans from
new hospitals 
Looks at hospital token,
not lung
Only looks at last sentence and 
ignores context
Caption image
Describes green
hillside as grazing sheep
Uses background to
recognise primary object
Article: Super Bowl 50
Paragraph: “Peython Manning became the first quarterback 
ever to lead two dierent teams to multiple Super Bowls. He 
is also the oldest quarterback ever to play in a Super Bowl 
at age 39. The past record was held by John Elway, who 
led the Broncos to victory in Super Bowl XXXIII at age 38 
and is currently Denver’s Executive Vice President of Foot-
ball Operations and General Manager. Quarterback Je 
Dean had a jersey number 37 in Champ Bowl XXXIV.”
Question: “What is the name of the quarterback who was 
38 in Super Bowl XXXIII?”
Original Prediction: John Elway
Prediction under adversary: Je Dean
Figure 1. Deep neural networks often solve problems by taking shortcuts instead of learning the
intended solution, leading to a lack of generalisation and unintuitive failures. This pattern can be
observed in many real-world applications.
the same time, however, researchers are unsatisfied about the lack of a deeper understand-
ing of the underlying principles and limitations. Different from the past, tackling this lack
of understanding is not a purely scientific endeavour anymore but has become an urgent
necessity due to the growing societal impact of machine learning applications. If we are
to trust algorithms with our lives by being driven in an autonomous vehicle, if our job ap-
plications are to be evaluated by neural networks, if our cancer screening results are to be
assessed with the help of deep learning—then we indeed need to understand thoroughly:
When does deep learning work? When does it fail, and why?
In terms of understanding the limitations of deep learning, we are currently observing
a large number of failure cases, some of which are visualised in Figure 1. DNNs achieve
super-human performance recognising objects, but even small invisible changes [8] or a
different background context [9, 10] can completely derail predictions. DNNs can generate
a plausible caption for an image, but—worryingly—they can do so without ever looking
at that image [11]. DNNs can accurately recognise faces, but they show high error rates
for faces from minority groups [12]. DNNs can predict hiring decisions on the basis of
re´sume´s, but the algorithm’s decisions are biased towards selecting men [13].
How can this discrepancy between super-human performance on one hand and aston-
ishing failures on the other hand be reconciled? One central observation is that many
failure cases are not independent phenomena, but are instead connected in the sense that
DNNs follow unintended “shortcut” strategies. While superficially successful, these strate-
gies typically fail under slightly different circumstances. For instance, a DNN may appear
to classify cows perfectly well—but fails when tested on pictures where cows appear out-
side the typical grass landscape, revealing “grass” as an unintended (shortcut) predictor
for “cow” [9]. Likewise, a language model may appear to have learned to reason—but
drops to chance performance when superficial correlations are removed from the dataset
[14]. Worse yet, a machine classifier successfully detected pneumonia from X-ray scans
of a number of hospitals, but its performance was surprisingly low for scans from novel
hospitals: The model had unexpectedly learned to identify particular hospital systems with
near-perfect accuracy (e.g. by detecting a hospital-specific metal token on the scan, see
Figure 1). Together with the hospital’s pneumonia prevalence rate it was able to achieve a
reasonably good prediction—without learning much about pneumonia at all [15].
At a principal level, shortcut learning is not a novel phenomenon. The field of machine
learning with its strong mathematical underpinnings has long aspired to develop a formal
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understanding of shortcut learning which has led to a variety of mathematical concepts and
an increasing amount of work under different terms such as learning under covariate shift
[16], anti-causal learning [17], dataset bias [18], the tank legend [19] and the Clever Hans
effect [20]. This perspective aims to present a unifying view of the various phenomena that
can be collectively termed shortcuts, to describe common themes underlying them, and lay
out the approaches that are being taken to address them both in theory and in practice.
The structure of this perspective is as follows. Starting from an intuitive level, we in-
troduce shortcut learning across biological neural networks (Section 2) and then approach
a more systematic level by introducing a taxonomy (Section 3) and by investigating the
origins of shortcuts (Section 4). In Section 5, we highlight how these characteristics affect
different areas of deep learning (Computer Vision, Natural Language Processing, Agent-
based Learning, Fairness). The remainder of this perspective identifies actionable strate-
gies towards diagnosing and understanding shortcut learning (Section 6) as well as current
research directions attempting to overcome shortcut learning (Section 7). Overall, our se-
lection of examples is biased towards Computer Vision since this is one of the areas where
deep learning has had its biggest successes, and an area where examples are particularly
easy to visualise. We hope that this perspective facilitates the awareness for shortcut learn-
ing and motivates new research to tackle this fundamental challenge we currently face in
machine learning.
2 Shortcut learning in biological neural networks
Shortcut learning typically reveals itself by a strong discrepancy between intended and
actual learning strategy, causing an unexpected failure. Interestingly, machine learning is
not alone with this issue: From the way students learn to the unintended strategies rats use
in behavioural experiments—variants of shortcut learning are also common for biological
neural networks. We here point out two examples of unintended learning strategies by
natural systems in the hope that this may provide an interesting frame of reference for
thinking about shortcut learning within and beyond artificial systems.
2.1 Shortcut learning in Comparative Psychology: unintended
cue learning
Rats learned to navigate a complex maze apparently based on subtle colour differences—
very surprising given that the rat retina has only rudimentary machinery to support at best
somewhat crude colour vision. Intensive investigation into this curious finding revealed
that the rats had tricked the researchers: They did not use their visual system at all in the
experiment and instead simply discriminated the colours by the odour of the colour paint
used on the walls of the maze. Once smell was controlled for, the remarkable colour dis-
crimination ability disappeared ...1
Animals are no strangers to finding simple, unintended solutions that fail unexpectedly:
They are prone to unintended cue learning, as shortcut learning is called in Comparative
Psychology and the Behavioural Neurosciences. When discovering cases of unintended
cue learning, one typically has to acknowledge that there was a crucial difference between
1Nicholas Rawlins, personal communication with F.A.W. some time in the early 1990s, confirmed via email
on 12.11.2019.
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performance in a given experimental paradigm (e.g. rewarding rats to identify different
colours) and the investigated mental ability one is actually interested in (e.g. visual colour
discrimination). In analogy to machine learning, we have a striking discrepancy between
intended and actual learning outcome.
2.2 Shortcut learning in Education: surface learning
Alice loves history. Always has, probably always will. At this very moment, however, she is
cursing the subject: After spending weeks immersing herself in the world of Hannibal and
his exploits in the Roman Empire, she is now faced with a number of exam questions that
are (in her opinion) to equal parts dull and difficult. “How many elephants did Hannibal
employ in his army—19, 34 or 40?” ... Alice notices that Bob, sitting in front of her, seems
to be doing very well. Bob of all people, who had just boasted how he had learned the
whole book chapter by rote last night ...
In educational research, Bob’s reproductive learning strategy would be considered surface
learning, an approach that relies on narrow testing conditions where simple discriminative
generalisation strategies can be highly successful. This fulfils the characteristics of shortcut
learning by giving the appearance of good performance but failing immediately under more
general test settings. Worryingly, surface learning helps rather than hurts test performance
on typical multiple-choice exams [21]: Bob is likely to receive a good grade, and judging
from grades alone Bob would appear to be a much better student than Alice in spite of her
focus on understanding. Thus, in analogy to machine learning we again have a striking
discrepancy between intended and actual learning outcome.
3 Shortcuts defined: a taxonomy of decision rules
With examples of biological shortcut learning in mind (examples which we will return to
in Section 6), what does shortcut learning in artificial neural networks look like? Figure 2
shows a simple classification problem that a neural network is trained on (distinguishing
a star from a moon).2 When testing the model on similar data (blue) the network does
very well—or so it may seem. Very much like the smart rats that tricked the experimenter,
the network uses a shortcut to solve the classification problem by relying on the location
of stars and moons. When location is controlled for, network performance deteriorates
to random guessing (red). In this case (as is typical for object recognition), classification
based on object shape would have been the intended solution, even though the difference
between intended and shortcut solution is not something a neural network can possibly
infer from the training data.
On a general level, any neural network (or machine learning algorithm) implements
a decision rule which defines a relationship between input and output—in this example
assigning a category to every input image. Shortcuts, the focus of this article, are one
particular group of decision rules. In order to distinguish them from other decision rules,
we here introduce a taxonomy of decision rules (visualised in Figure 3), starting from a
very general rule and subsequently adding more constraints until we approach the intended
solution.
2Code is available from https://github.com/rgeirhos/shortcut-perspective.
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Figure 2. Toy example of shortcut learning in neural networks. When trained on a simple dataset
of stars and moons (top row), a standard neural network (three layers, fully connected) can easily
categorise novel similar exemplars (mathematically termed i.i.d. test set, defined later in Section 3).
However, testing it on a slightly different dataset (o.o.d. test set, bottom row) reveals a shortcut
strategy: The network has learned to associate object location with a category. During training,
stars were always shown in the top right or bottom left of an image; moons in the top left or bottom
right. This pattern is still present in samples from the i.i.d. test set (middle row) but not in o.o.d. test
images (bottom row), exposing the shortcut.
(1) all possible decision rules, including non-solutions
Imagine a model that tries to solve the problem of separating stars and moons by predicting
“star” every time it detects a white pixel in the image. This model uses an uninformative
feature (the grey area in Figure 3) and does not reach good performance on the data it was
trained on, since it implements a poor decision rule (both moon and star images contain
white pixels). Typically, interesting problems have an abundant amount of non-solutions.
(2) training solutions, including overfitting solutions
In machine learning it is common practice to split the available data randomly into a train-
ing and a test set. The training set is used to guide the model in its selection of a (hopefully
useful) decision rule, and the test set is used to check whether the model achieves good per-
formance on similar data it has not seen before. Mathematically, the notion of similarity
between training and test set commonly referred to in machine learning is the assumption
that the samples in both sets are drawn from the same distribution. This is the case if both
the data generation mechanism and the sampling mechanism are identical. In practice this
is achieved by randomising the split between training and test set. The test set is then
called independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with regard to the training set. In or-
der to achieve high average performance on the test set, a model needs to learn a function
that is approximately correct within a subset of the input domain which covers most of
the probability of the distribution. If a function is learned that yields the correct output on
the training images but not on the i.i.d. test images, the learning machine uses overfitting
features (the blue area in Figure 3).
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Figure 3. Taxonomy of decision rules. Among the set of all possible rules, only some solve the
training data. Among the solutions that solve the training data, only some generalise to an i.i.d. test
set. Among those solutions, shortcuts fail to generalise to different data (o.o.d. test sets), but the
intended solution does generalise.
(3) i.i.d. test solutions, including shortcuts
Decision rules that solve both the training and i.i.d. test set typically score high on standard
benchmark leaderboards. However, even the simple toy example can be solved through at
least three different decision rules: (a) by shape, (b) by counting the number of white pixels
(moons are smaller than stars) or (c) by location (which was correlated with object category
in the training and i.i.d. test sets). As long as tests are performed only on i.i.d. data, it is
impossible to distinguish between these. However, one can instead test models on datasets
that are systematically different from the i.i.d. training and test data (also called out-of-
distribution or o.o.d. data). For example, an o.o.d. test set with randomised object size
will instantly invalidate a rule that counts white pixels. Which decision rule is the intended
solution is clearly in the eye of the beholder, but humans often have clear expectations. In
our toy example, humans typically classify by shape. A standard fully connected neural
network3 trained on this dataset, however, learns a location-based rule (see Figure 2). In
this case, the network has used a shortcut feature (the blue area in Figure 3): a feature that
helps to perform well on i.i.d. test data but fails in o.o.d. generalisation tests.
(4) intended solution
Decision rules that use the intended features (the red area in Figure 3) work well not only
on an i.i.d. test set but also perform as intended on o.o.d. tests, where shortcut solutions
fail. In the toy example, a decision rule based on object shape (the intended feature) would
generalise to objects at a different location or with a different size. Humans typically have a
strong intuition for what the intended solution should be capable of. Yet, for complex prob-
lems, intended solutions are mostly impossible to formalise, so machine learning is needed
to estimate these solutions from examples. Therefore the choice of examples, among other
aspects, influence how closely the intended solution can be approximated.
3A convolutional (rather than fully connected) network would be prevented from taking this shortcut by design.
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4 Shortcuts: where do they come from?
Following this taxonomy, shortcuts are decision rules that perform well on i.i.d. test data
but fail on o.o.d. tests, revealing a mismatch between intended and learned solution. It is
clear that shortcut learning is to be avoided, but where do shortcuts come from, and what
are the defining real-world characteristics of shortcuts that one needs to look out for when
assessing a model or task through the lens of shortcut learning? There are two different as-
pects that one needs to take into account. First, shortcut opportunities (or shortcut features)
in the data: possibilities for solving a problem differently than intended (Section 4.1). Sec-
ond, feature combination: how different features are combined to form a decision rule
(Section 4.2). Together, these aspects determine how a model generalises (Section 4.3).
4.1 Dataset: shortcut opportunities
What makes a cow a cow? To DNNs, a familiar background can be
as important for recognition as the object itself, and sometimes even
more important: A cow at an unexpected location (such as a beach
rather than grassland) is not classified correctly [9]. Conversely, a
lush hilly landscape without any animal at all might be labelled as a
“herd of grazing sheep” by a DNN [22].
This example highlights how a systematic relationship between object and background or
context can easily create a shortcut opportunity. If cows happen to be on grassland for
most of the training data, detecting grass instead of cows becomes a successful strategy for
solving a classification problem in an unintended way; and indeed many models base their
predictions on context [23, 24, 25, 26, 9, 27, 10]. Many shortcut opportunities are a conse-
quence of natural relationships, since grazing cows are typically surrounded by grassland
rather than water. These so-called dataset biases have long been known to be problematic
for machine learning algorithms [18]. Humans, too, are influenced by contextual biases (as
evident from faster reaction times when objects appear in the expected context), but their
predictions are much less affected when context is missing [28, 29, 30, 31]. In addition
to shortcut opportunities that are fairly easy to recognise, deep learning has led to the dis-
covery of much more subtle shortcut features, including high-frequency patterns that are
almost invisible to the human eye [32, 33]. Whether easy to recognise or hard to detect,
it is becoming more and more evident that shortcut opportunities are by no means disap-
pearing when the size of a dataset is simply scaled up by some orders of magnitude (in the
hope that this is sufficient to sample the diverse world that we live in [34]). Systematic
biases are still present even in “Big Data” with large volume and variety, and consequently
even large real-world datasets usually contain numerous shortcut opportunities. Overall,
it is quite clear that data alone rarely constrains a model sufficiently, and that data cannot
replace making assumptions [35]. The totality of all assumptions that a model incorporates
(such as, e.g., the choice of architecture) is called the inductive bias of a model and will be
discussed in more detail in Section 6.3.
7
4.2 Decision rule: shortcuts from discriminative learning
What makes a cat a cat? To standard DNNs, the example image on
the left clearly shows an elephant, not a cat. Object textures and
other local structures in images are highly useful for object classifi-
cation in standard datasets [36], and DNNs strongly rely on texture
cues for object classification, largely ignoring global object shape
[37, 38].
In many cases, relying on object textures can be sufficient to solve an object categorisation
task. Obviously, however, texture is only one of many attributes that define an object.
Discriminative learning differs from generative modeling by picking any feature that is
sufficient to reliably discriminate on a given dataset but the learning machine has no notion
of how realistic examples typically look like and how the features used for discrimination
are combined with other features that define an object. In our example, using textures
for object classification becomes problematic if other intended attributes (like shape) are
ignored entirely. This exemplifies the importance of feature combination: the definition
of an object relies on a (potentially highly non-linear) combination of information from
different sources or attributes that influence a decision rule.4 In the example of the cat
with elephant texture above, a shape-agnostic decision rule that merely relies on texture
properties clearly fails to capture the task of object recognition as it is understood for
human vision. While the model uses an important attribute (texture) it tends to equate
it with the definition of the object missing out other important attributes such as shape.
Of course, being aligned with the human decision rule does not always conform to our
intention. In medical or safety-critical applications, for instance, we may instead seek an
improvement over human performance.
Inferring human-interpretable object attributes like shape or texture from an image
requires specific nonlinear computations. In typical end-to-end discriminative learning,
this again may be prone to shortcut learning. Standard DNNs do not impose any human-
interpretability requirements on intermediate image representations and thus might be
severely biased to the extraction of overly simplistic features which only generalise under
the specific design of the particular dataset used but easily fail otherwise. Discriminative
feature learning goes as far that some decision rules only depend on a single predictive
pixel [39, 40, 41] while all other evidence is ignored.5 In principle, ignoring some evi-
dence can be beneficial. In object recognition, for example, we want the decision rule to be
invariant to an object shift. However, undesirable invariance (sometimes called excessive
invariance) is harmful and modern machine learning models can be invariant to almost all
features that humans would rely on when classifying an image [41].
4In Cognitive Science, this process is called cue combination.
5In models of animal learning, the blocking effect is a related phenomenon. Once a predictive cue/feature (say,
a light flash) has been associated with an outcome (e.g. food), animals sometimes fail to associate a new, equally
predictive cues with the same outcome [42, 43, 44].
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Figure 4. Both human and machine vision generalise, but they generalise very differently. Left:
image pairs that belong to the same category for humans, but not for DNNs. Right: images pairs
assigned to the same category by a variety of DNNs, but not by humans.
4.3 Generalisation: how shortcuts can be revealed
What makes a guitar a guitar? When tested on this pattern never seen
before, standard DNNs predict “guitar” with high certainty [45].
Exposed by the generalisation test, it seems that DNNs learned to
detect certain patterns (curved guitar body? strings?) instead of gui-
tars: a successful strategy on training and i.i.d. test data that leads to
unintended generalisation on o.o.d. data.
This exemplifies the inherent link between shortcut learning and generalisation. By itself,
generalisation is not a part of shortcut learning—but more often than not, shortcut learning
is discovered through cases of unintended generalisation, revealing a mismatch between
human-intended and model-learned solution. Interestingly, DNNs do not suffer from a
general lack of o.o.d. generalisation (Figure 4) [45, 36, 46, 41]. DNNs recognise guitars
even if only some abstract pattern is left—however, this remarkable generalisation perfor-
mance is undesired, at least in this case. In fact, the set of images that DNNs classify as
“guitar” with high certainty is incredibly big. To humans only some of these look like gui-
tars, others like patterns (interpretable or abstract) and many more resemble white noise
or even look like airplanes, cats or food [8, 45, 41]. Figure 4 on the right, for example,
highlights a variety of image pairs that have hardly anything in common for humans but
belong to the same category for DNNs. Conversely, to the human eye an image’s category
is not altered by innocuous distribution shifts like rotating objects or adding a bit of noise,
but if these changes interact with the shortcut features that DNNs are sensitive to, they
completely derail neural network predictions [8, 47, 9, 48, 49, 50, 38]. This highlights
that generalisation failures are neither a failure to learn nor a failure to generalise at all,
but instead a failure to generalise in the intended direction—generalisation and robustness
can be considered the flip side of shortcut learning. Using a certain set of features creates
insensitivity towards other features. Only if the selected features are still present after a
distribution shift, a model generalises o.o.d.
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5 Shortcut learning across deep learning
Taken together, we have seen how shortcuts are based on dataset shortcut opportunities
and discriminative feature learing that result in a failure to generalise as intended. We will
now turn to specific application areas, and discover how this general pattern appears across
Computer Vision, Natural Language Processing, Agent-based (Reinforcement) Learning
and Fairness / algorithmic decision-making. While shortcut learning is certainly not lim-
ited to these areas, they might be the most prominent ones where the problem has been
observed.
Computer Vision To humans, for example, a photograph of a car still shows the same
car even when the image is slightly transformed. To DNNs, in contrast, innocuous trans-
formations can completely change predictions. This has been reported in various cases
such as shifting the image by a few pixels [47], rotating the object [49], adding a bit of
random noise or blur [51, 50, 52, 53] or (as discussed earlier) by changing background
[9] or texture while keeping the shape intact [38] (see Figure 4 for examples). Some key
problems in Computer Vision are linked to shortcut learning. For example, transferring
model performance across datasets (domain transfer) is challenging because models often
use domain-specific shortcut features, and shortcuts limit the usefulness of unsupervised
representations [54]. Furthermore, adversarial examples are particularly tiny changes to
an input image that completely derail model predictions [8] (an example is shown in Fig-
ure 4). Invisible to the human eye, those changes modify highly predictive patterns that
DNNs use to classify objects [33]. In this sense, adversarial examples—one of the most
severe failure cases of neural networks—can at least partly be interpreted as a consequence
of shortcut learning.
Natural Language Processing The widely used language model BERT has been
found to rely on superficial cue words. For instance, it learned that within a dataset of nat-
ural language arguments, detecting the presence of “not” was sufficient to perform above
chance in finding the correct line of argumentation. This strategy turned out to be very use-
ful for drawing a conclusion without understanding the content of a sentence [14]. Natural
Language Processing suffers from very similar problems as Computer Vision and other
fields. Shortcut learning starts from various dataset biases such as annotation artefacts
[55, 56, 57, 58]. Feature combination crucially depends on shortcut features like word
length [59, 60, 14, 61], and consequently leads to a severe lack of robustness such as an
inability to generalise to more challenging test conditions [62, 63, 64, 65]. Attempts like
incorporating a certain degree of unsupervised training as employed in prominent language
models like BERT [5] and GPT-2 [66] did not resolve the problem of shortcut learning [14].
Agent-based (Reinforcement) Learning Instead of learning how to play Tetris, an
algorithm simply learned to pause the game to evade losing [67]. Systems of Agent-based
Learning are usually trained using Reinforcement Learning and related approaches such
as evolutionary algorithms. In both cases, designing a good reward function is crucial,
since a reward function measures how close a system is to solving the problem. However,
they all too often contain unexpected shortcuts that allow for so-called reward hacking
[68]. The existence of loopholes exploited by machines that follow the letter (and not the
spirit) of the reward function highlight how difficult it is to design a shortcut-free reward
function [69]. Reinforcement Learning is also a widely used method in Robotics, where
there is a commonly observed generalisation or reality gap between simulated training
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environment and real-world use case. This can be thought of as a consequence of narrow
shortcut learning by adapting to specific details of the simulation. Introducing additional
variation in colour, size, texture, lighting, etc. helps a lot in closing this gap [70, 71].
Fairness & algorithmic decision-making Tasked to predict strong candidates on
the basis of their re´sume´s, a hiring tool developed by Amazon was found to be biased
towards preferring men. The model, trained on previous human decisions, found gender to
be such a strong predictor that even removing applicant names would not help: The model
always found a way around, for instance by inferring gender from all-woman college names
[13]. This exemplifies how some—but not all—problems of (un)fair algorithmic decision-
making are linked to shortcut learning: Once a predictive feature is found by a model, even
if it is just an artifact of the dataset, the model’s decision rule may depend entirely on the
shortcut feature. When human biases are not only replicated, but worsened by a machine,
this is referred to as bias amplification [72]. Other shortcut strategies include focusing on
the majority group in a dataset while accepting high error rates for underrepresented groups
[12, 73], which can amplify existing societal disparities and even create new ones over
time [74]. In the dynamical setting a related problem is called disparity amplification [74],
where sequential feedback loops may amplify a model’s reliance on a majority group. It
should be emphasised, however, that fairness is an active research area of machine learning
closely related to invariance learning that might be useful to quantify and overcome biases
of both machine and human decision making.
6 Diagnosing and understanding shortcut learning
Shortcut learning currently occurs across deep learning, causing machines to fail unexpect-
edly. Many individual elements of shortcut learning have been identified long ago by parts
of the machine learning community and some have already seen substantial progress, but
currently a variety of approaches are explored without a commonly accepted strategy. We
here outline three actionable steps towards diagnosing and analysing shortcut learning.
6.1 Interpreting results carefully
Distinguishing datasets and underlying abilities Shortcut learning is most decep-
tive when gone unnoticed. The most popular benchmarks in machine learning still rely
on i.i.d. testing which drags attention away from the need to verify how closely this test
performance measures the underlying ability one is actually interested in. For example, the
ImageNet dataset [75] was intended to measure the ability “object recognition”, but DNNs
seem to rely mostly on “counting texture patches” [36]. Likewise, instead of performing
“natural language inference”, some language models perform well on datasets by simply
detecting correlated key words [56]. Whenever there is a discrepancy between the simplic-
ity with which a dataset (e.g. ImageNet, SQuAD) can be solved and the complexity evoked
by the high-level description of the underlying ability (e.g. object recognition, scene under-
standing, argument comprehension), it is important to bear in mind that a dataset is useful
only for as long as it is a good proxy for the ability one is actually interested in [56, 76].
We would hardly be intrigued by reproducing human-defined labels on datasets per se (a
lookup table would do just as well in this case)—it is the underlying generalisation ability
that we truly intend to measure, and ultimately improve upon.
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Morgan’s Canon for machine learning Recall the cautionary tale of rats sniffing
rather than seeing colour, described in Section 2.1. Animals often trick experimenters by
solving an experimental paradigm (i.e., dataset) in an unintended way without using the un-
derlying ability one is actually interested in. This highlights how incredibly difficult it can
be for humans to imagine solving a tough challenge in any other way than the human way:
Surely, at Marr’s implementational level [77] there may be differences between rat and
human colour discrimination. But at the algorithmic level there is often a tacit assump-
tion that human-like performance implies human-like strategy (or algorithm) [78]. This
same strategy assumption is paralleled by deep learning: Surely, DNN units are different
from biological neurons—but if DNNs successfully recognise objects, it seems natural to
assume that they are using object shape like humans do [37, 36, 38].
Comparative Psychology with its long history of comparing mental abilities across
species has coined a term for the fallacy to confuse human-centered interpretations of an
observed behaviour and the actual behaviour at hand (which often has a much simpler
explanation): anthropomorphism, “the tendency of humans to attribute human-like psy-
chological characteristics to nonhumans on the basis of insufficient empirical evidence”
[79, p. 5]. As a reaction to the widespread occurrence of this fallacy, psychologist Lloyd
Morgan developed a conservative guideline for interpreting non-human behaviour as early
as 1903. It later became known as Morgan’s Canon: “In no case is an animal activity to be
interpreted in terms of higher psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms
of processes which stand lower on the scale of psychological evolution and development”
[80, p. 59]. Picking up on a simple correlation, for example, would be considered a pro-
cess that stands low on this psychological scale whereas “understanding a scene” would
be considered much higher. It has been argued that Morgan’s Canon can and should be
applied to interpreting machine learning results [79], and we consider it to be especially
relevant in the context of shortcut learning. Accordingly, it might be worth acquiring the
habit to confront machine learning models with a “Morgan’s Canon for machine learn-
ing”6: Never attribute to high-level abilities that which can be adequately explained by
shortcut learning.
Testing (surprisingly) strong baselines In order to find out whether a result may
also be explained by shortcut learning, it can be helpful to test whether a baseline model
exceeds expectations even though it does not use intended features. Examples include us-
ing nearest neighbours for scene completion and estimating geolocation [81, 82], object
recognition with local features only [36], reasoning based on single cue words [59, 14]
or answering questions about a movie without ever showing the movie to a model [83].
Importantly, this is not meant to imply that DNNs cannot acquire high-level abilities. They
certainly do have the potential to solve complex challenges and serve as scientific models
for prediction, explanation and exploration [84]—however, we must not confuse perfor-
mance on a dataset with the acquisition of an underlying ability.
6.2 Detecting shortcuts: towards o.o.d. generalisation tests
Making o.o.d. generalisation tests a standard practice Currently, measuring model
performance by assessing validation performance on an i.i.d. test set is at the very heart of
the vast majority of machine learning benchmarks. Unfortunately, in real-world settings
6Our formulation is adapted from Hanlon’s razor, “Never attribute to malice that which can be adequately
explained by stupidity”.
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the i.i.d. assumption is rarely justified; in fact, this assumption has been called “the big lie
in machine learning” [85]. While any metric is typically only an approximation of what
we truly intend to measure, the i.i.d. performance metric may not be a good approximation
as it can often be misleading, giving a false sense of security. In Section 2.2 we described
how Bob gets a good grade on a multiple-choice exam through rote learning. Bob’s repro-
ductive approach gives the superficial appearance of excellent performance, but it would
not generalise to a more challenging test. Worse yet, as long as Bob continues to receive
good grades through surface learning, he is unlikely to change his learning strategy.
Within the field of Education, what is the best practice to avoid surface learning? It
has been argued that changing the type of examination from multiple-choice tests to essay
questions discourages surface learning, and indeed surface approaches typically fail on
these kinds of exams [21]. Essay questions, on the other hand, encourage so-called deep or
transformational learning strategies [86, 87], like Alice’s focus on understanding. This in
turn enables transferring the learned content to novel problems and consequently achieves a
much better overlap between the educational objectives of the teacher and what the students
actually learn [88]. We can easily see the connection to machine learning—transferring
knowledge to novel problems corresponds to testing generalisation beyond the narrowly
learned setting [89, 90, 91]. If model performance is assessed only on i.i.d. test data, then
we are unable to discover whether the model is actually acquiring the ability we think it is,
since exploiting shortcuts often leads to deceptively good results on standard metrics [92].
We, among many others [93, 78, 94, 95, 96], have explored a variety of o.o.d. tests and we
hope it will be possible to identify a sufficiently simple and effective test procedure that
could replace i.i.d. testing as a new standard method for benchmarking machine learning
models in the future.
Designing good o.o.d. tests While a distribution shift (between i.i.d. and o.o.d. data)
has a clear mathematical definition, it can be hard to detect in practice [101, 102]. In
these cases, training a classifier to distinguish samples in dataset A from samples in dataset
A’ can reveal a distribution shift. We believe that good o.o.d. tests should fullfill at least
the following three conditions: First, per definition there needs to be a clear distribution
shift, a shift that may or may not be distinguishable by humans. Second, it should have
a well-defined intended solution. Training on natural images while testing on white noise
would technically constitute an o.o.d. test but lacks a solution. Third, a good o.o.d. test
is a test where the majority of current models struggle. Typically, the space of all con-
ceivable o.o.d. tests includes numerous uninteresting tests. Thus given limited time and
resources, one might want to focus on challenging test cases. As models evolve, gener-
alisation benchmarks will need to evolve as well, which is exemplified by the Winograd
Schema Challenge [103]. Initially designed to overcome shortcut opportunities caused by
the open-ended nature of the Turing test, this common-sense reasoning benchmark was
scrutinised after modern language models started to perform suspiciously well—and it in-
deed contained more shortcut opportunities than originally envisioned [104], highlighting
the need for revised tests. Fortunately, stronger generalisation tests are beginning to gain
traction across deep learning. While o.o.d. tests will likely need to evolve alongside the
models they aim to evaluate, a few current encouraging examples are listed in Box I. In
summary, rigorous generalisation benchmarks are crucial when distinguishing between the
intended and a shortcut solution, and it would be extremely useful if a strong generally
applicable testing procedure will emerge from this range of approaches.
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Box I. EXAMPLES OF INTERESTING O.O.D. BENCHMARKS
We here list a few selected, encouraging examples of o.o.d. benchmarks.
Adversarial attacks can be seen as testing on model-specific worst-case o.o.d. data, which
makes it an interesting diagnostic tool. If a successful adversarial attack [8] can change model
predictions without changing semantic content, this is an indication that something akin to
shortcut learning may be occurring [33, 97].
ARCT with removed shortcuts is a language argument comprehension dataset that follows the
idea of removing known shortcut opportunities from the data itself in order to create harder test
cases [14].
Cue conflict stimuli like images with conflicting texture and shape information pitch fea-
tures/cues against each other, such as an intended against an unintended cue [38]. This approach
can easily be compared to human responses.
ImageNet-A is a collection of natural images that several state-of-the-art models consistently
classify wrongly. It thus benchmarks models on worst-case natural images [46].
ImageNet-C applies 15 different image corruptions to standard test images, an approach we find
appealing for its variety and usability [52].
ObjectNet introduces the idea of scientific controls into o.o.d. benchmarking, allowing to
disentangle the influence of background, rotation and viewpoint [98].
PACS and other domain generalisation datasets require extrapolation beyond i.i.d. data per
design by testing on a domain different from training data (e.g. cartoon images) [99].
Shift-MNIST / biased CelebA / unfair dSprites are controlled toy datasets that introduce corre-
lations in the training data (e.g. class-predictive pixels or image quality) and record the accuracy
drop on clean test data as a way of finding out how prone a given architecture and loss function
are to picking up on shortcuts [39, 40, 100, 41].
6.3 Shortcuts: why are they learned?
The “Principle of Least Effort” Why are machines so prone to learning shortcuts,
detecting grass instead of cows [9] or a metal token instead of pneumonia [15]? Exploit-
ing those shortcuts seems much easier for DNNs than learning the intended solution. But
what determines whether a solution is easy to learn? In Linguistics, a related phenomenon
is called the “Principle of Least Effort” [119], the observation that language speakers gen-
erally try to minimise the amount of effort involved in communication. For example, the
use of “plane” is becoming more common than “airplane”, and in pronouncing “cupboard”,
“p” and “b” are merged into a single sound [120, 121]. Interestingly, whether a language
change makes it easier for the speaker doesn’t always simply depend on objective measures
like word length. On the contrary, this process is shaped by a variety of different factors,
including the anatomy (architecture) of the human speech organs and previous language
experience (training data).
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Box II. SHORTCUT LEARNING & INDUCTIVE BIASES
The four components listed below determine the inductive bias of a model and dataset: the set of
assumptions that influence which solutions are learnable, and how readily they can be learned.
Although in theory DNNs can approximate any function (given potentially infinite capacity)
[105], their inductive bias plays an important role for the types of patterns they prefer to learn
given finite capacity and data.
• Structure: architecture. Convolutions make it harder for a model to use location—a
prior [106] that is so powerful for natural images that even untrained networks can be
used for tasks like image inpainting and denoising [107]. In Natural Language Processing,
transformer architectures [108] use attention layers to understand the context by modelling
relationships between words. In most cases, however, it is hard to understand the implicit
priors in a DNN and even standard elements like ReLU activations can lead to unexpected
effects like unwarranted confidence [109].
• Experience: training data. As discussed in Section 4.1, shortcut opportunities are present
in most data and rarely disappear by adding more data [32, 69, 56, 38, 33]. Modifying
the training data to block specific shortcuts has been demonstrated to work for reducing
adversarial vulnerability [110] and texture bias [38].
• Goal: loss function. The most commonly used loss function for classification, cross-
entropy, encourages DNNs to stop learning once a simple predictor is found; a modifica-
tion can force neural networks to use all available information [41]. Regularisation terms
that use additional information about the training data have been used to disentangle in-
tended features from shortcut features [39, 111].
• Learning: optimisation. Stochastic gradient descent and its variants bias DNNs towards
learning simple functions [112, 113, 114, 115]. The learning rate influences which patterns
networks focus on: Large learning rates lead to learning simple patterns that are shared
across examples, while small learning rates facilitate complex pattern learning and mem-
orisation [116, 117]. The complex interactions between training method and architecture
are poorly understood so far; strong claims can only be made for simple cases [118].
Understanding the influence of inductive biases In a similar vein, whether a solu-
tion is easy to learn for machines does not simply depend on the data but on all of the four
components of a machine learning algorithm: architecture, training data, loss function, and
optimisation. Often, the training process starts with feeding training data to the model with
a fixed architecture and randomly initialised parameters. When the model’s prediction is
compared to ground truth, the loss function measures the prediction’s quality. This super-
vision signal is used by an optimiser for adapting the model’s internal parameters such that
the model makes a better prediction the next time. Taken together, these four components
(which determine the inductive bias of a model) influence how certain solutions are much
easier to learn than others, and thus ultimately determine whether a shortcut is learned
instead of the intended solution [122]. Box II provides an overview of the connections
between shortcut learning and inductive biases.
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7 Beyond shortcut learning
A lack of out-of-distribution generalisation can be observed all across machine learning.
Consequently, a significant fraction of machine learning research is concerned with over-
coming shortcut learning, albeit not necessarily as a concerted effort. Here we highlight
connections between different research areas. Note that an exhaustive list would be out of
the scope for this work. Instead, we cover a diverse set of approaches we find promising,
each providing a unique perspective on learning beyond shortcut learning.
Domain-specific prior knowledge Avoiding reliance on unintended cues can be achieved
by designing architectures and data-augmentation strategies that discourage learning short-
cut features. If the orientation of an object does not matter for its category, either data-
augmentation or hard-coded rotation invariance [123] can be applied. This strategy can
be applied to almost any well-understood transformation of the inputs and finds its proba-
bly most general form in auto-augment as an augmentation strategy [124]. Extreme data-
augmentation strategies are also the core ingredient of the most successful semi-supervised
[125] and self-supervised learning approaches to date [126, 127].
Adversarial examples and robustness Adversarial attacks are a powerful analysis tool for
worst-case generalisation [8]. Adversarial examples can be understood as counterfactual
explanations, since they are the smallest change to an input that produces a certain output.
Achieving counterfactual explanations of predictions aligned with human intention makes
the ultimate goals of adversarial robustness tightly coupled to causality research in machine
learning [128]. Adversarially robust models are somewhat more aligned with humans and
show promising generalisation abilities [129, 130]. While adversarial attacks test model
performance on model-dependent worst-case noise, a related line of research focuses on
model-independent noise like image corruptions [51, 52].
Domain adaptation, -generalisation and -randomisation These areas are explicitly con-
cerned with out-of-distribution generalisation. Usually, multiple distributions are observed
during training time and the model is supposed to generalise to a new distribution at test
time. Under certain assumptions the intended (or even causal) solution can be learned
from multiple domains and environments [131, 39, 111]. In robotics, domain randomisa-
tion (setting certain simulation parameters randomly during training) is a very successful
approach for learning policies that generalise to similar situations in the real-world [70].
Fairness Fairness research aims at making machine decisions “fair” according to a cer-
tain definition [132]. Individual fairness aims at treating similar individuals similarly
while group fairness aims at treating subgroups no different than the rest of the population
[133, 134]. Fairness is closely linked to generalisation and causality [135]. Sensitive group
membership can be viewed as a domain indicator: Just like machine decisions should not
typically be influenced by changing the domain of the data, they also should not be biased
against minority groups.
Meta-learning Meta-learning seeks to learn how to learn. An intermediate goal is to learn
representations that can adapt quickly to new conditions [136, 137, 138]. This ability is
connected to the identification of causal graphs [139] since learning causal features allows
for small changes when changing environments.
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Generative modelling and disentanglement Learning to generate the observed data forces
a neural network to model every variation in the training data. By itself, however, this does
not necessarily lead to representations useful for downstream tasks [140], let alone out-
of-distribution generalisation. Research on disentanglement addresses this shortcoming by
learning generative models with well-structured latent representations [141]. The goal is
to recover the true generating factors of the data distribution from observations [142] by
identifying independent causal mechanisms [128].
8 Conclusion
“The road reaches every place, the short cut only one”
— James Richardson [143]
Science aims for understanding. While deep learning as an engineering discipline has seen
tremendous progress over the last few years, deep learning as a scientific discipline is still
lagging behind in terms of understanding the principles and limitations that govern how
machines learn to extract patterns from data. A deeper understanding of how to overcome
shortcut learning is of relevance beyond the current application domains of machine learn-
ing and there might be interesting future opportunities for cross-fertilisation with other
disciplines such as Economics (designing management incentives that do not jeopardise
long-term success by rewarding unintended “shortcut” behaviour) or Law (creating laws
without “loophole” shortcut opportunities). Until the problem is solved, however, we offer
the following four recommendations:
(1) Connecting the dots: shortcut learning is ubiquitous
Shortcut learning appears to be a ubiquitous characteristic of learning systems, biologi-
cal and artificial alike. Many of deep learning’s problems are connected through shortcut
learning—models exploit dataset shortcut opportunities, select only a few predictive fea-
tures instead of taking all evidence into account, and consequently suffer from unexpected
generalisation failures. “Connecting the dots” between affected areas is likely to facilitate
progress, and making progress can generate highly valuable impact across various appli-
cations domains.
(2) Interpreting results carefully
Discovering a shortcut often reveals the existence of an easy solution to a seemingly com-
plex dataset. We argue that we will need to exercise great care before attributing high-level
abilities like “object recognition” or “language understanding” to machines, since there is
often a much simpler explanation.
(3) Testing o.o.d. generalisation
Assessing model performance on i.i.d. test data (as the majority of current benchmarks do)
is insufficient to distinguish between intended and unintended (shortcut) solutions. Conse-
quently, o.o.d. generalisation tests will need to become the rule rather than the exception.
(4) Understanding what makes a solution easy to learn
DNNs always learn the easiest possible solution to a problem, but understanding which
solutions are easy (and thus likely to be learned) requires disentangling the influence of
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structure (architecture), experience (training data), goal (loss function) and learning (opti-
misation), as well as a thorough understanding of the interactions between these factors.
Shortcut learning is one of the key roadblocks towards fair, robust, deployable and trust-
worthy machine learning. While overcoming shortcut learning in its entirety may poten-
tially be impossible, any progress towards mitigating it will lead to a better alignment be-
tween learned and intended solutions. This holds the promise that machines behave much
more reliably in our complex and ever-changing world, even in situations far away from
their training experience. Furthermore, machine decisions would become more transpar-
ent, enabling us to detect and remove biases more easily. Currently, the research on short-
cut learning is still fragmented into various communities. With this perspective we hope to
fuel discussions across these different communities and to initiate a movement that pushes
for a new standard paradigm of generalisation that is able to replace the current i.i.d. tests.
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Appendix
A Toy example: method details
The code to reproduce our toy example (Figure 2) is available from https://github.com/rgeirhos/
shortcut-perspective. Two easily distinguishable shapes (star and moon) were placed on a
200×200 dimensional 2D canvas. The training set is constructed out of 4000 images, where 2000
contain a star shape and 2000 a moon shape. The star shape is randomly placed in the top right and
bottom left quarters of the canvas, whereas the moon shape is randomly placed in the top left and
bottom right quarters of the canvas. At test time the setup is nearly identical, 1000 images with a
star and 1000 images with a moon are presented. However, this time the position of star and moon
shapes are randomised over the full canvas, i.e. in test images stars and moons can appear at any
location.
We train two classifiers on this dataset: a fully connected network as well as a convolutional
network. The classifiers are trained for five epochs with a batch size of 100 on the training set and
evaluated on the test set. The training objective is standard crossentropy loss and the optimizer is
Adam with a learning rate of 0.00001, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and ε = 1e−08. The fully connected
network was a three-layer ReLU MLP (multilayer perceptron) with 1024 units in each layer and
two output units corresponding to the two target classes. It reaches 100% accuracy at training time
and approximately chance-level accuracy at test time (51.0%). The convolutional network had three
convolutional layers with 128 channels, a stride of 2 and filter size of 5×5 interleaved with ReLU
nonlinearities, followed by a global average pooling and a linear layer mapping the 128 outputs to
the logits. It reaches 100% accuracy on train and test set.
B Image rights & attribution
Figure 1 consists of four images from different sources. The first image from the left was taken from
https://aiweirdness.com/post/171451900302/do-neural-nets-dream-of-electric-sheep
with permission of the author. The second image from the left was generated by ourselves. The third
image from the left is from ref. [15]. It was released under the CC BY 4.0 license as stated here:
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and adapted by us from Figure 2B of the corresponding publication. The image on the right
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